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Pathways from Trauma to Psychotic
Experiences: A Theoretically
Informed Model of Posttraumatic
Stress in Psychosis
Amy Hardy1,2*
1 Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London, London, UK, 2 Psychosis Clinical Academic
Group, South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK
In recent years, empirical data and theoretical accounts relating to the relationship
between childhood victimization and psychotic experiences have accumulated. Much
of this work has focused on co-occurring Posttraumatic Stress Disorder or putative
causal mechanisms in isolation from each other. The complexity of posttraumatic
stress reactions experienced in psychosis remains poorly understood. This paper
therefore attempts to synthesize the current evidence base into a theoretically
informed, multifactorial model of posttraumatic stress in psychosis. Three trauma-
related vulnerability factors are proposed to give rise to intrusions and to affect
how people appraise and cope with them. First, understandable attempts to survive
trauma become habitual ways of regulating emotion, manifesting in cognitive-affective,
behavioral and interpersonal responses. Second, event memories, consisting of
perceptual and episodic representations, are impacted by emotion experienced during
trauma. Third, personal semantic memory, specifically appraisals of the self and others,
are shaped by event memories. It is proposed these vulnerability factors have the
potential to lead to two types of intrusions. The first type is anomalous experiences
arising from emotion regulation and/or the generation of novel images derived from
trauma memory. The second type is trauma memory intrusions reflecting, to varying
degrees, the retrieval of perceptual, episodic and personal semantic representations.
It is speculated trauma memory intrusions may be experienced on a continuum from
contextualized to fragmented, depending on memory encoding and retrieval. Personal
semantic memory will then impact on how intrusions are appraised, with habitual
emotion regulation strategies influencing people’s coping responses to these. Three
vignettes are outlined to illustrate how the model accounts for different pathways
between victimization and psychosis, and implications for therapy are considered. The
model is the first to propose how emotion regulation and autobiographical memory may
lead to a range of intrusive experiences in psychosis, and therefore attempts to explain
the different phenomenological associations observed between trauma and intrusions.
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However, it includes a number of novel hypotheses that require empirical testing, which
may lead to further refinement. It is anticipated the model will assist research and
practice, in the hope of supporting people to manage the impact of victimization on
their lives.
Keywords: trauma, psychosis, posttraumatic stress, emotion regulation, perceptual memory, episodic memory,
personal semantic memory, intrusions
INTRODUCTION
It seems obvious that what happens in our lives has the potential
to shape how we are. And yet, for so long in mental healthcare, the
life stories of people with psychosis have been neglected. A wealth
of empirical evidence now questions this position, highlighting
the significant impact that traumatic events1, particularly
childhood victimization, can have on people’s difficulties (Morgan
and Gayer-Anderson, 2016). The challenge, therefore, is to reduce
the impact of adversity on the lives of people with psychosis.
Necessary steps include a focus on prevention, and a humane
approach to identification, safeguarding and redress (Read and
Bentall, 2012). Alongside this, effective interventions are needed
to support people to manage the consequences of victimization
and move on in life. The development of trauma-focused therapy
for psychosis is dependent on an evidence-based understanding
of the pathways from trauma to psychotic experiences. This
understanding can then be used to highlight targets and strategies
for intervention, in line with the interventionist causal model
(Kendler and Campbell, 2009). But this is no easy task. The
diverse phenomenology of psychosis indicates these pathways
are complex; they will vary from person to person and fluctuate
over time. Nonetheless, progress is being made in identifying
possible underlying mechanisms and theoretical models have
been proposed.
This paper outlines a multifactorial model that aims to
integrate existing accounts, drawing on cognitive-behavioral,
attachment and neuropsychological perspectives of psychosis
and PTSD. Within the model, these accounts are viewed as
complimentary, in that both cognitive-behavioral and attachment
approaches highlight the importance of internal representations
of experience, the meaning derived from these experiences, the
ways emotions are regulated, and how these mechanisms interact
with neuropsychological processes. A central role is therefore
proposed for autobiographical memory and trauma-related
emotion regulation strategies in shaping the phenomenology of
intrusive imagery, subsequent appraisals and coping responses.
Evidence and accounts of the relationships between trauma and
psychosis will first be briefly reviewed, then the new model
of posttraumatic stress in psychosis described. Three vignettes,
based on clinical experience, will be discussed in relation to the
model to illustrate the possible ways psychological posttraumatic
stress processes may play a role in psychosis. Implications
1Trauma, traumatic events and traumatic experiences are used interchangeably.
The considerable debate regarding the definition of traumatic stressors is
acknowledged and beyond the scope of this article (Friedman et al., 2011). For the
purposes of this paper, a broad definition of traumatic events is employed, defined
as any event(s) the individual perceives as involving a significant physical and/or
psychological threat to the self.
for intervention indicated by the model will be reflected on,
together with methodological challenges and directions for future
research.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TRAUMA
AND PSYCHOSIS
The relationship between trauma and psychosis is now
well established. Higher rates of childhood victimization and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD, DSM 5, American
Psychiatric Association, 2013) are reported across the spectrum of
psychosis compared to the general population, although findings
vary depending on the population sampled and methodology
used (Kessler et al., 2005; Achim et al., 2011; Matheson et al., 2013;
Kraan et al., 2015; Steel et al., 2017a). The most robust study of
PTSD prevalence estimated 16% of people with schizophrenia-
spectrum diagnoses meet diagnostic criteria (de Bont et al.,
2015). This is of relevance to mental healthcare as co-occurring
PTSD and psychosis appear to be associated with worse clinical
and functional outcomes, and difficulties with engagement,
adherence, and treatment response (Schneeberger et al., 2014;
Hassan and De Luca, 2015; Mondelli et al., 2015; Trotta et al.,
2015; Seow et al., 2016).
Given the higher incidence of trauma in psychosis, research
has considered whether victimization may play a causal role in
psychotic experiences, at least for some people. Demonstrating
the causality of trauma in psychosis is methodologically complex
and research is in its infancy. However, preliminary findings
are in line with the proposal that victimization does have
a causal effect. Prospective, case-control, and epidemiological
studies support an association, and dose-response relationships
and mediation by plausible mechanisms have been demonstrated
(Hill, 1965; Varese et al., 2012b; Kelleher et al., 2013; Alsawy et al.,
2015; Hardy et al., 2016; Amanuel et al., 2017; McGrath et al.,
2017).
A key controversy is whether victimization has a generic
impact on mental health outcomes or if there is some degree
of specificity between certain trauma types and symptoms of
psychosis (Bentall et al., 2014; van Nierop et al., 2014a, 2015;
van Dam et al., 2015). The latter hypothesis is based on the
possibility that some events may have a greater propensity to
trigger particular psychological mechanisms. For example, it has
been found that childhood sexual abuse is associated with voices,
whereas emotional abuse and neglect are related to paranoia, with
the former at least partially accounted for by emotion regulation
and the latter by beliefs about the self and others (Sitko et al.,
2014; Hardy et al., 2016; Wickham and Bentall, 2016). However,
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a consensus on the debate has yet to be reached and further
investigation is needed.
From a symptom-specific perspective, the association
between victimization and positive symptoms has been more
established than for negative symptoms (Bentall et al., 2014).
Relationships between trauma and negative symptoms are
feasible, given the proposal they represent a response to the
psychologically overwhelming trauma of psychosis, together
with the phenomenological overlap between them and the
avoidance and numbing symptoms of PTSD (Stampfer, 1990).
However, current findings are equivocal (Resnick et al., 2003;
Lysaker and Larocco, 2008; Vogel et al., 2013; van Dam et al.,
2015). Future work in the area will benefit from adopting
a symptom-specific dimensional approach to assessment,
distinguishing experiential from expressive negative symptoms
(Kirkpatrick et al., 2011).
The findings of studies examining the specificity of the impact
of trauma on psychosis will depend on the analytic approach
employed, whether the relationships within victimization types
and psychosis outcomes are considered, and if other difficulties,
such as depression, are viewed as co-occurring mental health
outcomes or mechanisms by which psychosis may arise. The
debate is further complicated by the phenomenological overlap
in traumagenic mental health problems, and that psychotic
experiences, such as voices and paranoia, are relatively common
in other diagnoses, including depression, bipolar affective
disorder, PTSD and personality disorder (Johnson et al., 1991;
Brewin and Patel, 2010; Schroeder et al., 2013; Cloitre et al., 2014;
McCarthy-Jones and Longden, 2015; Geddes et al., 2016; Palmier-
Claus et al., 2016; Kelleher and DeVylder, 2017; Okkels et al.,
2017). Adopting a transdiagnostic, network analytic approach,
examining potential causal systems of interacting symptoms, to
understand the interplay between victimization, posttraumatic
stress reactions and psychosis seems a promising way forward
(Looijesetijn et al., 2015; Isvoranu et al., 2016, 2017).
CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRAUMA
AND PSYCHOSIS
Seminal cognitive behavioral models of psychosis addressed how
trauma might shape beliefs, intrusions, appraisals and coping
responses (Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001). Central to these
models is the proposal that the triggering of a biopsychosocial
vulnerability gives rise to sensory-perceptual intrusions, which
leads to a search for meaning (Maher, 1974). It is these
attributions of meaning that result in psychotic experiences,
which are then maintained by attempts to cope. For example,
if a person’s childhood is characterized by physical abuse and
strict religious observance, they may develop beliefs that spiritual
entities are very powerful and that others will harm them. If
they then experience a mugging, leading to distress and disrupted
sleep, this could trigger an intrusion of a threatening voice saying
‘you’re going to get it’. In this context, it is understandable
they might interpret the voice as a sign of persecution by evil
spirits. This could then lead to hypervigilance, rumination and
interpersonal avoidance, which may paradoxically perpetuate
hearing voices through attentional focus, confirmatory bias and
reduced opportunities to feel safe around others. Whilst the
Garety et al. (2001) and Morrison (2001) models have been highly
influential in research and practice, they arguably do not consider
in detail the processes that may give rise to intrusions occurring
in the context of trauma.
Morrison et al. (2003) further expanded these accounts,
outlining three routes between trauma and psychosis: trauma
may lead to psychosis, psychosis and related experiences can
themselves give rise to PTSD, and that psychosis and PTSD may
lie on a spectrum of shared reactions to trauma. They propose
an integrative model of the spectrum of trauma reactions,
emphasizing how the interpretation of intrusions determines
the subsequent labeling of difficulties as PTSD or psychosis,
and their consequences. In turn, appraisals of intrusions may
be influenced by memory processes, dissociation and, schematic
and metacognitive beliefs about intrusive experiences and coping
responses. To return to the above example, if the person
recognized the voice content as being related to what the
perpetrator said during the mugging, the intrusion might instead
be appraised as trauma-related. In this case, it would be viewed as
a memory-based re-experiencing characteristic of PTSD instead
of an externally attributed voice reflective of psychosis. A strength
of this integrative model is in highlighting the potential spectrum
from posttraumatic stress to psychosis. However, it does not
consider in detail the diverse phenomenology of intrusions in
psychosis and adopts a somewhat categorical approach to the
appraisal of intrusions (i.e., that they will be attributed to either
PTSD or psychosis). Whilst memory is mentioned as a potential
process that might impact intrusions and how they are explained,
the specific ways in which memory might shape intrusions and
their interpretations is not explored.
Another important account, by Mueser et al. (2002), views
PTSD and psychosis as distinct entities, and adopts a pragmatic
position emphasizing how their symptoms may directly and
indirectly interact to exacerbate each other. The model is
descriptively useful at a symptom level, although unlike the
previously mentioned models does not comment on the causal
mechanisms that may give rise to PTSD and psychosis. Since
these initial proposals, a number of theorists (Steel et al., 2005;
Fowler et al., 2006; Longden et al., 2011; Read et al., 2014;
Barker et al., 2015; Berry and Bucci, 2015) and empirical studies
have added additional insights. A range of specific processes
have been highlighted in recent literature, including stress
sensitivity, dissociation, attachment styles, social defeat, trauma-
related beliefs, contextual integration, and intrusive memories
(e.g., Gracie et al., 2007; Varese et al., 2012a; Sitko et al., 2014;
Alsawy et al., 2015; Geddes et al., 2016; Jaya et al., 2016; Valmaggia
et al., 2016; Bucci et al., 2017). Broadly speaking, the processes
implicated relate to (1) attempts to regulate emotion and survive
trauma, (2) the storage and retrieval of trauma memories and
(3) the meaning derived from these memories in the form of
schema, beliefs or appraisals. However, this work has not yet been
synthesized into a multifactorial model.
In real world settings, the lack of integration of these findings
into a coherent framework is problematic, because people with
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psychosis and clinicians are faced with trying to understand
and manage a complex and diverse array of posttraumatic stress
reactions. Rates of diagnostic PTSD in psychosis are relatively
modest and do not account for the full range of posttraumatic
reactions that people experience. There is also variability in
the extent to which psychotic experiences appear objectively
or subjectively related to traumatic events, and this variation
requires explanation. For example, people sometimes report their
psychosis is unrelated to their trauma history, even though to
others there may appear to be links between them. Further,
people’s difficulties may lend themselves to distinct intervention
approaches if they arise from different underlying mechanisms.
A model integrating the current literature is clearly needed to
address these practical and conceptual challenges, which can then
guide formulation and intervention.
A MODEL OF POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS
IN PSYCHOSIS
Drawing on the accounts outlined above and more recent
findings in the area, a model of posttraumatic stress in
psychosis will be described, based on cognitive-behavioral,
attachment and neuropsychological perspectives of psychosis and
PTSD. Specifically, trauma-related emotion regulation strategies
and autobiographical memory are proposed to shape the
phenomenology of intrusive imagery and subsequent appraisals
and coping responses (see Figure 1). Distressing emotions are not
explicitly named in the model as they are viewed as interwoven in
all of the implicated processes, given the well-established role of
emotional experience as a precursor to, part of and consequence
of psychosis and PTSD (Birchwood, 2003; Freeman and Garety,
2003; Kessler et al., 2011; Fowler et al., 2012; Okkels et al.,
2017).
Vulnerability Factors
It is proposed in the model that one or more of three
trauma-related vulnerability factors (i.e., emotion regulation,
event memory (including perceptual and episodic memory
representations) and personal semantic memory) give rise to a
range of sensory-perceptual involuntary intrusions, and shape
the appraisals of these and the subsequent coping responses.
The theoretical basis for the vulnerability factors will first be
described, with evidence for their impact on psychosis detailed
in the “Intrusions,” “Appraisals,” and “Coping” Sections.
Emotion Regulation
The first psychological vulnerability factor proposed to lead to
the development and maintenance of trauma-related psychosis
consists of the ways in which people regulate emotions
associated with threat resulting from traumatic events. Read
et al. (2014) propose exposure to childhood victimization results
in neurodevelopmental changes such as hyperactivity of the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. This leaves people
vulnerable to understandable but unhelpful ways of regulating
stress, which may then contribute to psychosis. We respond
to threat with varying degrees of sympathetic (i.e., fight and
flight) and parasympathetic (i.e., flag and faint) nervous system
activation (the defense cascade), depending on the nature of
the event and the individual (Schauer and Elbert, 2010). In
the context of repeated childhood victimization, people may
repeatedly oscillate through cycles of these reactions such
that their response to the world is increasingly mediated by
defense cascade responses. Dissociative detachment or ‘shutting
down’ may be the most likely way of surviving inescapable
threat, leading to the parasympathetic system being more
persistently activated (Brown, 2006). These protective responses
may therefore become habitual means of regulating emotion. In
this sense, they can be viewed as attempts to survive extreme
circumstances where fundamental developmental needs are not
met (e.g., for safety, connection and autonomy) (Young et al.,
2003).
The defense cascade is primarily conceptualized as reflecting
cognitive-affective and behavioral responses. However, it
is proposed that when these emotion regulation strategies
become implicit ways of regulating threat, they will also show
themselves in how the person relates to others (Bowlby, 1969,
1973). Parallels can therefore be drawn between emotion
regulation and attachment styles (Hesse, 2008). For example,
sympathetic nervous system activation could result in anger or
fear, with congruent cognitive processing (e.g., hypervigilance
and threat-focused reasoning), and aggressive, dependent or
actively avoidant behavior and relating styles (Bartholomew and
Horowitz, 1991). In contrast, dissociative detachment response
(ranging from emotional numbing to more intense experiences
of derealization and depersonalization) and interpersonal
passivity may be manifestations of parasympathetic nervous
system activity (Brown, 2006; Vogel et al., 2013). Thus, childhood
victimization may result in increased or reduced stress sensitivity,
or fluctuations between the two (Main and Hesse, 1990). As
will be described in detail in the Sections on “Intrusions”
and “Coping,” these strategies can paradoxically increase an
individual’s sense of threat by impacting on intrusions and
coping responses, thereby perpetuating psychosis.
Event Memory
The second vulnerability factor is memory for victimization
events, which forms part of the autobiographical memory
system2. In this model, autobiographical memory is defined
as memory relating to life experiences that contributes to a
person’s sense of self and includes three levels of representation.
Personal semantic memory consists of abstracted meaning about
the self, others and the world, which is derived from specific
episodic memories and general sociocultural knowledge. Episodic
memory consists of declarative, contextualized and allocentric
event representations that can be manipulated, and voluntarily
and involuntarily retrieved. Perceptual memory consists of
2Different, albeit overlapping, conceptualizations of autobiographical memory
have been proposed in the literature, with debate over the precise mechanisms
involved (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Baddley, 2001; Brewin, 2001, 2014;
Conway, 2001, 2005, 2009; Tulving, 2002, 2005; Brewin et al., 2010; Prebble et al.,
2013). For the purposes of this model and ease of understanding, a pragmatic
conceptualization is adopted. This is done with the acknowledgment that some
theorists have used different terminology to describe the referenced concepts.
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FIGURE 1 | A model of posttraumatic stress in psychosis.
detailed, egocentric, viewpoint dependent representations
of sensory-perceptual stimuli experienced during events.
Perceptual memory is held to be inaccessible to intentional
retrieval independent of episodic or personal semantic
memory representations but may, under certain conditions, be
involuntarily recalled. Perceptual and episodic representations
are relevant to understanding the storage and retrieval of event
memory, and will be considered below, with the role of personal
semantic memory as a vulnerability factor outlined in the next
section.
So, how do we store and recall memory for events,
and how do emotions experienced during trauma impact on
event memory? Memory researchers propose that long-term
memory for specific, everyday events is primarily a function
of episodic memory, processed in the structures of the medial
temporal lobe, including the hippocampus, and prefrontal
areas (Tulving et al., 1991; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000;
Brewin, 2001, 2014; Conway, 2001, 2005, 2009; Brewin et al.,
2010). When an event is experienced, sensory-perceptual stimuli
(including emotions, sights, sounds, sensations, tastes and
smells) are initially encoded in perceptual memory through
subcortical structures such as the amygdala. This encoding
is then converted into a more abstract representation in
episodic memory, consisting of a contextual representation of
spatio-temporal information (of when and where stimuli were
experienced), which in turn is integrated into personal semantic
memory.
In everyday situations, the sensory-perceptual information
in perceptual memory fades once it has been represented in
episodic memory, and becomes relatively inaccessible. However,
the event memory is still available for voluntary retrieval. When
a person tries to recollect what happened, a search leads to the
activation of the abstract representation in episodic memory,
which then reconstructs the associated perceptual representation.
This memory will be experienced as sufficiently vivid to conjure
a sense of recollection, but less intensely than when the event
actually happened, so it is perceived as a past experience.
For example, if someone is asked what happened on a recent
shopping trip, this will trigger an iterative search of his or her
memory until the specific episodic representation of the event
is identified. The abstract, episodic representation will then be
used to reconstruct the perceptual experiences associated with the
shopping trip so the person can recollect what happened.
Critical to understanding the role of victimization in psychosis
is the proposal that, in the context of increased emotion,
representations in perceptual memory may be encoded in greater
detail than usual (Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Hackmann and
Holmes, 2004; Brewin et al., 2010). The consequence of this is
that when the episodic memory is later retrieved, the sensory-
perceptual stimuli present at the time of the event (stored in
perceptual memory) will be experienced more intensely than
if encoded under less emotional conditions. For example, if a
person accidentally urinated in public during a shopping trip, the
anxiety and shame experienced as a result would be encoded in
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detail in their perceptual memory. When the memory is recalled
it would still be experienced as a past recollection, but the detailed
perceptual representation would result in the emotions felt at the
time being acutely experienced in the present moment.
Further, cognitive-behavioral models of PTSD propose that,
under conditions of extreme emotion, the episodic processing
of information may also change. The encoding of contextualized
representations is inhibited (also known as C-reps, arising from
conceptual processing; Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Brewin et al.,
2010) and, instead, stimuli are encoded in even greater detail
in perceptual memory (also known as sensory representations,
or S-reps, driven by data driven processing; Ehlers and Clark,
2000; Brewin et al., 2010). This has an evolutionary advantage
as it supports faster processing of information and activation
of survival responses, and also ensures detailed information
about threat is available after danger has passed, when important
learning can be integrated into memory (LeDoux, 1998).
However, event memories encoded under conditions of
extreme emotion are retrieved differently from less emotional
memories. First, given their reduced contextualization in episodic
memory, perceptual memories are highly vulnerable to being
directly retrieved by internal or external stimuli reminiscent
of the highly arousing event. When this happens, they will
be experienced (to a greater or lesser extent) as vivid and
occurring in the ‘here and now’. This type of memory retrieval
therefore reflects the hallmark re-experiencing symptoms of
PTSD. Second, intentional recall of events is impaired, as
the associated episodic memory has not been fully elaborated,
particularly for moments of highest arousal during events
(known as hotspots, Grey and Holmes, 2008). Thus, if a
person experienced intense arousal due to witnessing a violent,
armed robbery during a shopping trip, the episodic encoding
of this event would be inhibited, whilst the storage of sensory-
perceptual experiences would be enhanced. This would mean the
person would have difficulty intentionally recalling a coherent
account of the robbery, particularly peripheral details. They
would also be vulnerable to experiencing intrusions, for example,
of seeing people bleeding and feeling very scared, triggered
by reminders of the event (e.g., going shopping, seeing men,
ruminating about how they could have been killed). Intrusions
encoded under circumstances of extreme emotion can become
less intrusive if people are able to experience their memories,
so the perceptual representations fade and become integrated
into episodic memory. However, if people avoid their memory
intrusions, the contextualization of episodic memory is prevented
and involuntary intrusions will be maintained.
Habitual emotion regulation strategies related to persistent
victimization may be particularly problematic for the storage
and retrieval of distressing events. Whilst these strategies may
be protective during trauma, they may exacerbate disruptions
in episodic memory processing. If persistent, they will then
prevent the contextual elaboration of perceptual memories
into episodic memory representations, leading to intrusion
maintenance. Indeed, Steel et al. (2005) and Fowler et al.
(2006) argue that people affected by psychosis may have a
weakened ability to integrate contextual information, possibly
due to enhanced stress sensitivity. This is likely to further disrupt
memory processing and the contextualization of perceptual
representations in episodic memory (Read et al., 2014). People
with a vulnerability to psychosis may therefore have perceptual
memories that are even more fragmented from episodic memory.
Plausibly, contextual representations could be absent at storage
or retrieval such that the involuntary retrieval of perceptual
memory is experienced with no awareness of its association
to a past traumatic event. In this circumstance, the witness
to the armed robbery who experiences intrusions of people
bleeding and feeling scared may view these, not as memories,
but as a premonition of a future attack. The potential role
of extremely decontextualized memory intrusions in psychosis
will be explored further in the Section “Intrusions: Memory
Intrusions.”
Personal Semantic Memory
The third vulnerability factor for trauma-related psychosis is
personal semantic memory, which reflects autobiographical
knowledge that is abstracted from a specific time or place, and is
likely mediated by the neocortex (Prebble et al., 2013). Personal
semantic memory can therefore be viewed as reflecting the
beliefs, schemas or appraisals implicated in cognitive-behavioral
models of psychosis and PTSD, which can maintain problematic
event memory representations (Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Garety
et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001; Brewin et al., 2010). Alternatively,
the cognitive-affective representations of the self and others in
personal semantic memory also have parallels with the internal
working models outlined by attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969,
1973). Personal semantic memory is derived from both episodic
memories and broader sociocultural knowledge, and in this sense
may be a proximal cognitive-affective mechanism by which risk
factors associated with social defeat impact on psychosis (Selten
et al., 2016). Personal semantic memory can be retrieved in
concordance with or in isolation from episodic and perceptual
memories; meaning it may be activated as abstract knowledge
divorced from event content or in parallel with event memories
to produce a rich, autobiographical experience.
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), Conway (2001, 2005,
2009), and Conway et al. (2004) propose personal semantic
memory is categorically organized into general events, life
periods and life stories, and may be particularly derived from
key self-referent or self-defining episodic memories (Singer
and Salovey, 1993). It is part of a self-memory system (SMS)
dependent on frontotemporal regions of the brain. The SMS
consists of personal semantic memory and a working self. The
working self is a goal-orientated conductor of memory storage
and retrieval that organizes both personal semantic and episodic
memory in line with goals, to support problem solving and
planning. The activity of the working self dynamically leads
to and is shaped by personal semantic memory to derive an
abstracted representation of the self and world. In this regard,
personal semantic memory is held to be particularly central to
a coherent sense of self (James, 1890; Prebble et al., 2013). A key
function of the working self is to maintain correspondence and
coherence between internal and external reality, and current
goals. It therefore modifies memory encoding and retrieval to
meet these needs. As stability of the SMS is prioritized this
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potentially gives rise to distortions in memory, as representations
are modified to be congruent with the goals of the working self.
The SMS thus has a key role in the reconstructive nature of
memory. It may account for modifications in memory over time,
as it transforms to fit with the person’s current goals or concerns
(Conway and Loveday, 2015).
Childhood victimization will understandably shape personal
semantic memory and the working self. Given these systems
are resistant to change, they therefore provide a means through
which victimization can have a pervasive impact on how people
experience and interpret the world. A threat-focused SMS will
give rise to congruent storage and recall of event memories. For
example, a person who has the appraisal ‘I am bad’ represented
in their personal semantic memory, based on memories of
what their abusers said about them, would be more likely to
retrieve episodic and perceptual representations in line with this
appraisal, and to store aspects of new experiences which are
consistent with this view of themselves.
Intrusions
It is proposed that the trauma-related vulnerability factors
outlined above are likely to give rise to certain types of
intrusive imagery that, dependent on how they are appraised and
responded to, may then lead to psychosis. The importance of
imagery in understanding mental wellbeing, including psychosis,
has long been recognized (Beck, 1970; Lang, 1977; Garety et al.,
2001; Morrison, 2001; Hackmann and Holmes, 2004). Images
are defined as “contents of consciousness that possess sensory
qualities as opposed to those that are purely verbal or abstract”
(Hackmann et al., 1998, p. 301) and can occur in any sensory
modality. They are experienced “on a continuum from the
near veridical reconstruction in the mind of a real event to
the construction of an entirely hypothetical situation” (Martin
and Williams, 1990, p. 268), and in this sense may be past
or future orientated. Intrusive imagery is common, and so is
viewed as a normative process, with distress and functional
impact determined by responses to it (Hirsch and Holmes,
2007; Brewin et al., 2010). Transdiagnostically, it appears people
usually experience a relatively small number of recurrent images,
they tend to be thematically linked to people’s concerns, and
associations with specific adverse events may not be recognized
until people are encouraged to consider any links (Hackmann
and Holmes, 2004). In the context of psychosis, the most
studied type of imagery is voice hearing, although hallucinations
in other modalities and multimodal experiences also occur
and are increasingly subject to investigation (McCarthy-Jones
et al., 2012; Woods et al., 2015). Other studies have noted
that images are often associated with psychotic experiences,
although there has been relatively little investigation of their
phenomenology and relationship to memory (Morrison et al.,
2002; Schulze et al., 2013; Ison et al., 2014; Sheaves et al., 2015).
In this model of posttraumatic stress in psychosis, two types of
trauma-related intrusive imagery will be considered. Anomalous
experience intrusions influenced by emotion regulation strategies
and autobiographical memory, and trauma memory intrusions
arising from varying degrees of retrieval of personal semantic,
episodic and perceptual memory representations. It is suggested
that intrusions are likely to trigger each other, and so may act
synergistically in the development and maintenance of psychosis.
Intrusions: Anomalous Experiences
The first type of intrusions, anomalous experiences, are proposed
to arise through a number of putative pathways, involving
emotion regulation (i.e., hyperarousal and dissociation) and
representations in autobiographical memory. The rationale for
and evidence for each of these will be considered.
In relation to hyperarousal, a hypervigilance subtype of
voice hearing has been previously proposed (McCarthy-
Jones et al., 2012, 2014; Garwood et al., 2015) and within
this model is viewed as linked to the sensitization of the
sympathetic nervous system following childhood victimization.
Understandable hypervigilance to danger may result in a reduced
threshold for threat detection in environmental noise (e.g.,
perceiving background sounds of people talking or traffic as a
sign of danger), leading to intrusions of anomalous experiences.
Previous evidence has focused on threatening content arising
from the external environment, although it seems feasible this
process could also relate to internal stimuli, such as detecting
intrusions of somatic pain or felt-sense presences (McCarthy-
Jones et al., 2014). In line with a role for trauma-related
hypervigilance in anomalous experiences, Hardy et al. (2016)
found posttraumatic hyperarousal mediated the association
between childhood sexual abuse and voices in 228 people with
relapsing psychosis. However, this study was cross-sectional and
therefore the temporal association between hypervigilance and
voices was not established.
Dissociative detachment is also proposed as a driver of
anomalous experience intrusions. Habitual dissociation in an
attempt to manage threat may paradoxically give rise to intrusive
experiences. This is because it has a detrimental impact on the
integration of sensory-perceptual processes, and so may result
in intrusions into consciousness (Brown, 2006). The role of
dissociation in intrusive anomalous experiences is supported by
observed correlations between depersonalization/derealization
and hallucinatory experiences (Vogel et al., 2011; Alderson-Day
et al., 2014; Pilton et al., 2015), its mediation of the relationship
between childhood trauma and hallucinations (Perona-Garcelán
et al., 2012; Varese et al., 2012a; Hardy et al., 2016) and its
prediction of hallucinations in the flow of daily life (Udachina
et al., 2014).
The final way in which anomalous experience intrusions are
proposed to arise is through the impact of autobiographical
memory and the working self on current and future-orientated
imagery (Brewin et al., 2010). It is proposed that autobiographical
memory representations of childhood victimization may
indirectly shape anomalous experiences, as the working
self draws on personal semantic, episodic or perceptual
memory representations to generate novel imagery. This will be
affectively and/or perceptually congruent with the underlying
representations. For example, a person who has been the
victim of past harassment may experience an intrusive image of
being humiliated at an upcoming social event. The perceptual
qualities of this image (sensation of cheeks flushing, tension
and physiological arousal) together with the associated appraisal
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(others will judge me) will be shaped by their personal semantic
and event memories, even though the person may not have an
explicit awareness of the link between this image and their past
experiences.
Novel images generated from the working self and
autobiographical memory representations will be shaped by
victimization experiences and in this regard may map onto
the inner speech subtype of voices proposed by McCarthy-
Jones et al. (2012) and McCarthy-Jones et al. (2014). Evidence
in support of this mechanism comes from studies finding
that the autobiographical context of intrusions can be
present without subjective awareness, and the observation
that hallucinatory content is often thematically linked with
victimization and personal goals, suggesting a possible influence
of autobiographical memory representations and the working self
(Hardy et al., 2005; Corstens and Longden, 2013; McCarthy-Jones
et al., 2014; Varese et al., 2016).
Finally, it is also important to note that all anomalous
experience intrusions may, if sufficiently arousing, be encoded
as a long lasting memory representation and potentially intrude
through the mechanisms outlined below. For example, a person
who was neglected and bullied may be hypervigilant for
threat and have an appraisal “I am dirty” in their personal
semantic memory. This could lead to the generation of novel
olfactory and auditory imagery in the form of the smell of
feces and a voice saying, “you smell so bad, no one wants to
know you.” The distress associated with this experience could
lead to disruptions in autobiographical memory processing,
with the perceptual representation stored in detail and the
contextual, episodic representation inhibited, so the memory
of the voice and the smell could later be involuntarily
re-experienced.
Intrusions: Memory Intrusions
The second type of intrusions proposed to result from the
trauma-related vulnerability factors are those arising from
the direct retrieval of autobiographical memories. These are
hypothesized to fall along a continuum of contextual integration.
The position of intrusions is relatively rather than absolutely
defined. For the purposes of the model, three distinct positions
along the continuum are highlighted, although there will
be variation within these positions as to the degree of
contextualization experienced for any given intrusion. The
positions range from fully contextualized memory intrusions, to
those lacking in contextual integration (as is observed in the
re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD), to at the extreme end,
severely decontextualized memories that may be particularly
characteristic of psychosis.
It is emphasized that, at this time, the continuum is
speculative. It is not clear whether such a continuum exists
or, rather, whether memory intrusions may be more accurately
conceptualized categorically, experienced either as occurring
in the ‘here and now’ or as past memories (Brewin et al.,
2010). However, this dimensional approach to intrusions may
better reflect the dynamic and reconstructive nature of memory,
including how intrusions can be experienced with varying
degrees of awareness of their link to past events. The mechanisms
by which each of the three hypothesized types of memory
intrusion arises will be considered below.
Contextualized memory intrusions
Intrusions of emotionally salient, contextualized memories may
occur through two routes (Brewin et al., 2010). First, perceptual
memories formed by emotionally arousing experiences may be
retrieved by emotional or sensory cues, and given a context by
corresponding information in episodic memory. Alternatively,
a top–down process may occur when episodic memories are
triggered with their associated perceptual memory. For example,
if a person is dwelling on thoughts of being worthless, they
might involuntarily remember a time when they failed. The
contextual specifics of this event would be retrieved from
episodic memory (being expelled from school), together with the
corresponding perceptual memory of the stimuli present during
the time (sinking sensation in stomach, welling up and sadness).
Intrusions arising from this mechanism do not represent a shift
in the nature of memory processing, but rather the impact
of emotion on the storage and retrieval across the whole
autobiographical memory system. There has been relatively little
naturalistic investigation of this type of memory intrusion in
psychosis, however, indirect support for the presence of this
mechanism comes from findings indicating intrusive, coherent
memories occur transdiagnostically and are likely to arise in the
context of verbal, depressive rumination (Pearson et al., 2008;
Brewin et al., 2010).
Re-experiencing memory intrusions
Re-experiencing memory intrusions, the ‘hallmark’ symptoms of
PTSD, arise in the context of disruptions to the storage of event
memory, as previously outlined. Detailed encoding in perceptual
memory, coupled with inhibition of episodic representations, will
increase the likelihood of representations of stimuli present at
the time of trauma being triggered by associated cues (Brewin
et al., 2010; Brewin, 2014). When people experience this type
of intrusion, memory retrieval occurs, at least to some degree,
in isolation from broader autobiographical recollection and the
episodic grounding of events, such that they are experienced
with a sense of occurring in the ‘here and now’ (Brown, 2006).
However, the contextual, episodic representation is not entirely
inaccessible, so this type of intrusion will still be experienced
as linked to the associated event. Support for the role of
re-experiencing in psychosis comes from findings indicating
increased rates of PTSD in psychosis compared to the general
population (de Bont et al., 2015), results from a non-clinical study
that re-experiencing may partially account for the association
between childhood sexual abuse and hallucinations (Gracie et al.,
2007), and an association between posttraumatic intrusions and
hallucinations in a large-scale population survey (Alsawy et al.,
2015).
Fragmented memory intrusions
The final type of intrusions highlighted on the contextualisation
continuum are fragmented sensory-perceptual experiences
arising from perceptual memory representations. Together
with the proposed anomalous experience intrusions, these
memory intrusions are those that are most likely to reflect the
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hallucinatory imagery characteristic of psychosis. The theoretical
basis for this type of intrusion, as highlighted earlier, is the
proposal that people with psychosis may have a weakened
ability to integrate contextual information, possibly linked to
the sensitization of threat regulation (Steel et al., 2005; Fowler
et al., 2006; Waters et al., 2006). Previous investigations of this
hypothesis have highlighted that people high in schizotypy
report more frequent, distressing intrusions after watching a
traumatic film and following a road traffic accident (Holmes
and Steel, 2004; Steel et al., 2008), and that there may be an
association between contextual memory ability and intrusions
in people high in psychosis proneness (Glazer et al., 2013). Steel
and colleagues’ proposal therefore focuses on how contextual
integration difficulties increase intrusion frequency, with other
factors (e.g., paranormal beliefs) determining the appraisal of
these intrusions and whether they lead to psychosis.
This new model takes the contextual integration hypothesis
a step further to propose perceptual memory intrusions may
occur in the absence of any episodic context, such that they
are experienced as occurring in the ‘here and now’ with no
recollection of their link to past trauma. In this case, it is the
intrusion itself that will manifest as a hallucinatory, psychotic
experience, regardless of how it is appraised. Nonetheless,
this type of intrusion seems likely to compel the person to
attribute it externally. For example, if a person experiences an
intrusion of vaginal pain with no recollection of its association
to the pain experienced during a rape, it makes sense they
appraise this as an experience of being raped in the present
moment by an evil spirit. It is acknowledged that investigating
this hypothesis is methodologically fraught, as by definition
these fragments of memory will not be viewed as linked to
memory, which makes assessment of them difficult. Further,
such intrusions may be phenomenologically impossible to
distinguish from the intrusive anomalous experiences outlined
earlier.
However, there are some preliminary indications that this type
of memory intrusion may exist. First, this intrusion type has some
parallels with a previously proposed dissociative autobiographical
subtype of voice hearing, whereby people report experiencing
voices (not memories) that replay previously experienced content
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014). Further, studies demonstrating
links between the content of trauma and voices are possibly
in line with the involuntary retrieval of perceptual memories
shaping psychosis (Hardy et al., 2005; Read et al., 2005; Corstens
and Longden, 2013; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014). A recently
completed study also found that self-reported fragmentation of
intrusive memories was positively associated with the severity
of hallucinations, but not paranoia, in a small sample of people
with psychosis (Marsh-Picksley et al., in preparation). Whilst very
tentative, this study is the first to indicate that fragmentation of
perceptual memory intrusions may impact on psychosis. Further,
anecdotal evidence suggests that people may recognize their
intrusions as memory-related only after having the opportunity
to reflect on and contextualize episodic memories for the
associated events. For example, a threatening voice saying ‘I’m
going to have you’ being recognized, following trauma-focused
exposure therapy, as linked to what was said during a sexual
assault, when previously it had not been perceived as memory-
based.
Appraisals
In line with cognitive-behavioral models of psychosis and PTSD,
the way in which people appraise their experience of intrusions
will determine their consequences (Ehlers and Clark, 2000;
Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001). Within this model, it
is proposed that appraisals will particularly be influenced by
personal semantic memory and the goals of the working self.
Appraisals of intrusions will therefore be consistent with and
play a role in maintaining representations of the self and
others in personal semantic memory. Appraisals can be primary
(i.e., interpretations of the intrusion) and secondary (i.e., the
implications of the interpretation). For example, a whispering
voice may be interpreted as a sign of persecution by the devil
(primary) that the person views himself or herself as being too
weak to cope with (secondary). Both of these appraisals will
be shaped by personal semantic memory, such as, the person
believing they are evil and incompetent. Evidence supporting
the role of personal semantic memory in psychosis comes
from studies investigating trauma-related beliefs and schema,
social defeat and attachment. Research has found that trauma is
associated with negative beliefs about the self, world and others in
psychosis, and these at least partially account for the relationship
with paranoia in non-clinical, clinical and epidemiological
samples (Kilcommons and Morrison, 2005; Gracie et al., 2007;
Kilcommons et al., 2008; Geddes et al., 2016; Hardy et al., 2016;
Jaya et al., 2016; Wickham and Bentall, 2016).
Other work has investigated the concept of social defeat,
often assessed by measures of appraisals, which within this
model are viewed as being derived from representations
in personal semantic memory. For example, van Nierop
et al. (2014b) in a large epidemiological study found social
defeat mediated the relationship between childhood trauma,
the extended psychosis phenotype and clinically significant
psychosis. Similarly, Valmaggia et al. (2016) demonstrated the
prospective impact of social defeat on paranoia in people
at Ultra High Risk for psychosis compared to a control
group. UHR participants reported higher levels of social defeat
appraisals, and following exposure to a virtual social interaction
environment reported more paranoia than controls, predicted
by baseline levels of social defeat. Given social defeat is viewed
as being shaped by previous events, this study suggests people’s
interpretation of experiences within the virtual environment
was influenced by appraisals stored in their personal semantic
memory.
As noted previously, attachment styles can be viewed as
reflecting representations of self and others in personal semantic
memory. Insecure attachment, and particularly disorganized
attachment, is associated with childhood victimization, and
more severe psychotic experiences (Gumley et al., 2014; Korver-
Nieberg et al., 2014; van Dam et al., 2014; Wickham et al.,
2015; Bucci et al., 2017). Findings highlighting the role of
attachment styles in psychosis are therefore arguably consistent
with the view that appraisals in personal semantic memory
shape interpretations of intrusions to give rise to psychotic
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experiences. A final piece of evidence comes from a trial that
found trauma-focused interventions aiming to update threat-
related information in traumatic event memory reduced paranoia
as well as re-experiencing symptoms (van den Berg et al.,
2015). This finding is therefore in line with the view that
paranoid appraisals arise from autobiographical memory, and
that modifying these representations will improve paranoia.
Coping
Building on the proposal that habitual emotional regulation
strategies can arise in response to victimization, this section will
review how these strategies may, in turn, impact on coping with
intrusions and appraisals. As noted previously, these strategies
may relate to activation or deactivation of arousal, and manifest
cognitive-affectively, behaviorally or interpersonally. In relation
to the role of hyperarousal, is well established that stress
sensitivity is associated with psychosis (DeVylder et al., 2016).
Further, associations between childhood trauma and negative
reactivity to daily stressors have been found, together with links to
more severe positive symptoms (Glaser et al., 2006; Lataster et al.,
2010; Lardinois et al., 2011). More recently, people with psychosis
and a history of childhood trauma reported experiencing elevated
stress sensitivity and paranoia compared to controls when in
a virtual reality social environment (Veling et al., 2016). Other
findings in support of the role of hyperarousal include studies
demonstrating threat-focused processing in psychosis in the
context of childhood victimization. For example, Bendall et al.
(2013) found that people with a history of trauma demonstrated
selective attention to threatening stimuli compared to controls.
The previously mentioned findings by Hardy et al. (2016), that
hyperarousal mediated the association between childhood sexual
abuse and voices are also in line with this hypothesis. However,
the cross-sectional design meant it was not possible to identify
whether hyperarousal acted as a precursor to intrusions and/or
as a coping response to intrusions and appraisals.
Indirect support for the role of trauma-related emotion
regulation in psychosis also comes from findings highlighting
the role of sleep disruption and rumination in psychosis.
These have both been implicated as maintenance factors
in posttraumatic stress difficulties, as they may perpetuate
problematic autobiographical memory representations and
exacerbate intrusions (Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Williams et al.,
2007; Brewin et al., 2010; Freeman and Garety, 2014; Ricarte et al.,
2017). Substance use is another potential coping strategy, and
interactions have been found between childhood victimization,
cannabis use and the odds of experiencing psychosis (Morgan
et al., 2014). Fast thinking habits, or rapid reasoning, may also
reflect a way of coping with threatening intrusions and appraisals,
and could be associated with hyperaroused emotional regulation
(Garety and Hardy, 2017). However, an association between fast
thinking and emotion in psychosis has not been demonstrated,
although this may be due to assessments lacking ecological
validity (Freeman et al., 2008).
All the previously reviewed studies highlighting a role for
attachment styles and dissociation in psychosis are also consistent
with the hypothesized role of emotion regulation in coping with
psychosis. For example, insecure anxious and avoidant styles may
be linked to threat-focused coping, and disorganized attachment
may be particularly associated with dissociation as a coping
response (Braehler et al., 2013; van Dam et al., 2014; Bucci
et al., 2017). Powers et al. (2016) reported that avoidance and
numbing mediated the relationship between childhood trauma
and psychosis in a large sample, after controlling for demographic
variables and trauma exposure. Finally, it is noted that avoidant
coping may also manifest as experiential negative symptoms
(such as anhedonia, avolition and asociality) as people withdraw
in an attempt to cope with their psychotic experiences (Raffard
et al., 2010).
PATHWAYS FROM VICTIMIZATION TO
PSYCHOSIS: VIGNETTES
To illustrate the model, three vignettes will briefly be described,
based on clinical cases modified to ensure confidentiality. They
aim to highlight different pathways between victimization and
psychosis that anecdotally appear common in clinical practice.
They are not intended to reflect discrete categories or subtypes.
Whilst it is plausible that subtypes of trauma-related psychosis
do exist, further empirical work is needed to investigate this
hypothesis. Each person’s situation has been simplified, with a
particular focus on the intrusions that appear to be playing a
key role in driving their difficulties. The terminology in the
formulations has been adapted from Figure 1 to highlight how
the model can be modified to a person’s understanding of their
situation.
Tanya (see Figure 2)
Tanya described feeling very low and ashamed, as she believed
others did not want her around because she was a waste of space.
She reported things had always been this way, as growing up she
did not fit in at home or school. Tanya said she intentionally
made herself small so that others did not notice her, and became
increasingly detached to the extent she felt numb and not human.
It did not appear that she had experienced any periods of extreme
arousal (e.g., characterized by overwhelming fear, horror or
helpless) during her traumatic events of being excluded, although
they had understandably triggered strong emotions of anxiety
and shame. She reported being able to clearly recollect the most
difficult events, with vivid impressions of what happened.
When around others, Tanya experienced them looking away
from her and would be reminded of times when people had
treated her similarly in the past. She also reported often hearing
the voice of her dad criticizing what she was doing. Tanya
described how these experiences confirmed her longstanding
belief that people did not want her around because she was a
waste of space, and that she did not think that things would
ever change. She reported withdrawing and drinking alcohol
excessively. She said she often ruminated on how much she had
failed, and described a persistent, critical internal dialog.
In terms of formulating Tanya’s difficulties, it appears her early
experiences gave rise to a pervasive avoidant style of relating to
herself and others. This may have provided some protection from
people and the intensity of her internal distress. She was able to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 May 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 697
fpsyg-08-00697 May 22, 2017 Time: 18:58 # 11
Hardy A Model of Pathways from Trauma to Psychosis
FIGURE 2 | Posttraumatic stress in psychosis model: Tanya’s formulation.
coherently describe her past memories, with no avoidance, and
did not report experiencing extreme arousal at the time of these
events. This suggests her traumatic experiences had not been
of sufficient intensity to disrupt contextual memory processing.
Instead, she reported contextualized episodic memories, with
vivid perceptual representations of what she had experienced at
the time. The meaning of these experiences, that she was a waste
of space had been ingrained in her personal semantic memory,
and she was not able to recollect any alternative self-images.
In the context of this vulnerability, she was hypothesized to
have both anomalous experience and trauma memory intrusions.
The anomalous experiences took the form of perceiving others
to be giving her judgmental looks and hearing a critical voice
of her dad. It can be speculated that these experiences may
have arisen from dissociative detachment and novel images
generated from her autobiographical memory, in interaction
with ambiguous stimuli in the environment (e.g., people looking
at her). Memories of being excluded could have generated
anomalous internal experiences of perceiving others looking at
her judgmentally and a critical, derogatory voice. The salience
of these experiences may have been further magnified by her
persistent dissociation. The anomalous experience intrusions
may have triggered and/or been exacerbated by intrusions of
contextualized memories, such that Tanya would often have vivid
recollections of the most difficult times from her past.
Understandably, these intrusions appeared to confirm her
appraisal, represented in personal semantic memory, of herself
as a waste of space. Further, her secondary appraisal, that things
would never change, was in line with her lack of self-efficacy. Her
coping responses were shaped by how she had learnt to survive
growing up, with avoidance and rumination dominating, which
in turn maintained her difficulties.
The formulation indicates that recommended cognitive-
behavioral strategies may be of benefit, including developmental
and maintenance formulations, psychoeducation, normalization,
modifying coping, cognitive reappraisal, behavioral experiments
and imagery modification (Morrison, 2017). In addition, the
model specifically highlights the importance of addressing the
impact of past ways of coping and memory recall on current
problems. Following this, it appears imagery modification purely
aiming to elaborate contextual representations in Tanya’s episodic
memory, as in traditional exposure approaches, may not be
helpful because her memory is already contextualized (Foa et al.,
2007). Instead, it may be more useful to focus on developing
new episodic representations of her intrusive memories, using
techniques such as competitive memory training and imagery
rescripting (Steel et al., 2015; Morina et al., 2017).
Further, whilst simple imagery transformations could be used
to modify Tanya’s memory (e.g., imagining a time when she felt
excluded disappearing or a negative outcome happening to those
who left her out) it is possible that imagery modification may
be more potent if the transformation addresses representations
in both her event and personal semantic memory. This could
involve, for example, having a trusted older adult enter the
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memory to remind her that she is lovable and worthwhile,
even if others have not cared for her as they should. Given
Tanya’s prolonged attachment difficulties, she may need support
to notice or develop alternative experiences that can be drawn on
when updating memories and images. Limited re-parenting and
empathic confrontation, together with support to live a valued life
through social inclusion, may assist with developing these new
perspectives (Young et al., 2003).
Kobe (see Figure 3)
Kobe reported his main difficulty was people staring and
whispering about him. He explained how it was just him and
his mother growing up, who hurt him by making them have
sexual contact. Kobe said he would shut off during this abuse and
pretend it was not happening. He lived in fear of it happening
again and was always on the look out for ways to avoid it or
escape. Kobe described how he was quite confused about some
of what happened, and his memories from that period of his life
were different to later times. He indicated how he always knew
what happened was his fault as he was dirty.
Kobe said he could tell from others’ stares and whispers
that they were disgusted by him and knew what happened. He
also reported experiencing flashbacks and nightmares of being
sexually abused. Kobe further described having a very scary
experience of hearing his mum’s voice saying ‘be a good boy’
and feeling very spacey. He interpreted these experiences as
confirmation that everyone knew about and was judging him for
this past, and that his life had been ruined and he could not cope.
He described how he protected himself by trying not to think
about the past, having radar out for signs that people knew him,
and shutting down.
A preliminary understanding of Kobe’s difficulties suggests
he tried to cope with the abuse by alternating between being
hypervigilant for signs that an assault would happen, and
being dissociatively detached when it did and feeling shut off.
Kobe’s confused intentional recall of the abuse suggests that
his perceptual memory encoding could have been enhanced,
with his episodic processing of events inhibited, due to the
understandable extreme arousal he would have experienced. This
would have meant that his memories for the assaults were poorly
contextualized and vulnerable to being triggered by associated
stimuli. It may be that Kobe’s shutting off during assaults, and
being hypervigilant at other times, further exacerbated the lack
of episodic processing. His perceptual memories might have then
been even more fragmented from their episodic context. Kobe’s
main appraisals of his experiences, represented in his personal
semantic memory, were that he was dirty, it was his fault, and
others would judge him negatively for what happened.
Against this background of vulnerability factors, Kobe
had anomalous experience intrusions of people staring and
whispering about him, possibly driven by hypervigilance. He
was constantly alert for signs that people would know what had
happened, so would likely have a lower threshold for detecting
stimuli consistent with his fears. Kobe also experienced trauma
memory intrusions in the form of flashbacks and nightmares of
abuse, which made sense given the lack of contextualization of
his trauma memory. The intrusive voice and spacey sensation
Kobe experienced might have been manifestations of perceptual
memories that were very fragmented from their episodic context,
given they had content which appeared directly related to
the abuse but were not experienced as arising from memory.
Kobe experienced these intrusions not as posttraumatic stress
difficulties but as further confirmation of others’ judging him
for his past, in line with his appraisals in personal semantic
memory. His tricks to stay safe would likely further perpetuate
his difficulties. He constantly tried to suppress his intrusions,
was alert and experienced dissociative detachment. This made
it difficult for him to elaborate and contextualize his traumatic
memories, to have the opportunity to evaluate the validity
of his internal experiences and appraisals through developing
safer relationships with others, and to consider other possible
explanations for what might be happening.
As with Tanya, recommended cognitive-behavioral
approaches for psychosis may support Kobe in managing
his difficulties. However, in contrast to Tanya, his formulation
suggests memory exposure is indicated, with the aim of
elaborating and updating episodic memories so the perceptual
representations are less likely to intrude. Possible techniques
include narrative exposure therapy, prolonged exposure, reliving
with restructuring, and eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing therapy (Shapiro, 2001; Ehlers et al., 2005; Foa et al.,
2007; Schauer et al., 2011). However, to date, little is known about
the comparable effectiveness of these approaches in psychosis,
and what factors, if any, should moderate intervention choice. It
is also not clear whether exposure itself is sufficient to update the
memory, or whether further cognitive or experiential reappraisal
may be required.
A further dilemma in working with Kobe is how and
when to introduce memory-focused interventions. Best practice
guidelines recommend that trauma-focused therapy be offered.
However, targeting past memories may not be a priority for
Kobe. His main concern is people judging him negatively, even
though the formulation suggests elaborating his memory may
have a beneficial effect on his fears about others. As with any
therapy, an open and transparent discussion of intervention
options (including their pros and cons) is indicated to support
Kobe in identifying his preferred approach. This would also
involve developing a rationale for memory work that fitted within
Kobe’s belief system. For example, framing the aim of exposure as
being to minimize the impact of the past memories on him, so he
might be more able to focus on managing his current difficulties
with others.
Mo (See Figure 4)
Mo’s main concern was about being persecuted by the spiritual
mafia. He explained he was brought up in a children’s home
where he frequently experienced violent assaults. Mo said he
coped by having a shield on which meant he was not bothered
much by what was happening, although he also learnt to have
his guard up and was alert to signs of things kicking off. Mo was
dismissive when asked about his experiences, and said he did not
have much memory of what happened. However, he was clear
that he had learnt early in life that the world wants to ruin him. He
indicated that he now heard and saw shadowy figures shouting
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FIGURE 3 | Posttraumatic stress in psychosis model: Kobe’s formulation.
FIGURE 4 | Posttraumatic stress in psychosis model: Mo’s formulation.
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and being threatening, which would sometimes be accompanied
by physical pains. Mo described how he knew the spiritual mafia
was persecuting him, as he was cursed and it made sense others
would continue to assault him. He described how he still coped by
having his guard up, being alert to signs of trouble, and trying to
fight back. He also reported wearing protective clothing to reduce
the likelihood of the spirits being able to hurt him.
In terms of understanding Mo’s difficulties, his shield could
be viewed as an extreme form of dissociative detachment, as
he reported little or no emotional response to the assaults. He
also appeared to have become hyperviglance to threat, which
could reflect a sensitization to stress. Intriguingly, Mo reported
very little recollection of what had happened to him in the
past. It is difficult to establish the extent to which this reflected
an avoidance of memory retrieval and/or the nature of the
underlying memory representation for what happened. It is
possible that a shutting down of attention during the assaults
meant that his episodic encoding of them was significantly
limited such that he did have significantly impaired voluntary
retrieval for the events. However, given the nature of what
happened, he would have likely had at least some detailed
perceptual representations of the assaults. Mo’s appraisal of his
early experiences, represented in personal semantic memory, was
that he knew the world wanted to ruin him.
Mo reported no memory intrusions, although he did have
multimodal experiences of shadowy threatening figures and
experienced intrusive pain. Establishing the mechanisms
underlying these experiences is difficult, and alternative
hypotheses should be considered. However, the shadowy
threatening figures appear more thematically as opposed to
directly related to previous assaults (as the content of what
they said reflected current not past concerns) and he described
them as being adult figures, not children or young adults. It
is therefore hypothesized that these intrusive images might
have arisen from his emotion regulation strategies of having
his shield up and being on guard, together with his working
self and autobiographical memory representations generating
novel images that were thematically congruent with his previous
experiences. However, it is noted that these intrusions could
also arise from involuntary recall of memories modified over
successive retrieval attempts, in line with the goals of his working
self to be alert for danger.
In contrast, it is speculated that the somatic pain Mo
experienced could be a very fragmented intrusion arising from
perceptual memories of what he experienced during past assaults.
Given his report of his trauma memories, it is potentially feasible
that this perceptual memory fragment was so decontextualized
when intruding it had no grounding episodic context. As with
Tanya and Kobe, Mo’s appraisal of his intrusions was shaped
by his personal semantic memory (i.e., that others want to
harm him) and the anomalous nature of his intrusions, such
that he viewed them as being a spiritual attack by the mafia.
Trying to cope with this meant he was in a persistently
hyperaroused state, increasing the likelihood of him noticing any
possible threats, maintaining his appraisal of others in personal
semantic memory, and preventing any possibility to reflect on his
past.
Therapeutically, it is difficult to know whether trauma-
focused interventions would be helpful for Mo. He reported
no distressing impact of trauma although at the same time his
current concerns appeared to be a mirror to his past. As with
Tanya and Kobe, conventional cognitive-behavioral techniques
targeting his appraisals and coping may help him in developing a
sense of safety in life. In addition, at least some psychoeducation
about trauma and its consequences appears indicated. This could
include tentative exploration of Mo’s thoughts about whether
this information is relevant to his situation and, if he wishes
to pursue further, shared formulation about the ways his past
may contribute to his current difficulties. It of course should be
respected that Mo and others may never be willing or able to
address their experiences of victimization, and other approaches
can be effectively used to support moving on in life. Nonetheless,
it is suggested it is helpful to hold trauma-related hypotheses
in mind and ensure people are aware of the option of trauma-
focused therapy, should they wish to pursue this in the future.
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
A key implication of this model is that trauma and posttraumatic
stress processes should be assessed in psychosis. However,
evidence suggests routine assessment is rare in mental health
services (de Bont et al., 2015; Brooker et al., 2016). This is
particularly concerning in the UK, where it is recommended
in best practice guidelines (National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence [NICE], 2014). Improving practice requires the
development of a trauma-informed service culture, clinicians
having a biopsychosocial model of psychosis, skills training, and
supervision of assessment and follow-up (Walters et al., 2016).
It is also important to recognize that assessment of
posttraumatic stress in psychosis is complex. People often
have a multitude of trauma, posttraumatic stress and psychosis
experiences, with varying etiological origins. It can also be hard
to disentangle types of memory encoding and retrieval, and
establish whether difficulties are indeed trauma-related. Memory
representations, posttraumatic stress reactions and psychosis
will also change over time, influenced by a range of factors
(particularly the reconstructive nature of trauma memory) and
the potential to identify any links between them will oscillate
accordingly. In addition, it is obviously not possible to directly
assess stored memory representations; they can only be inferred
from people’s report of intrusions and their voluntary recall.
People’s reports will also be moderated by their ability to reflect
on their memory processes and links with prior difficulties, which
is a complex metacognitive task (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014).
Progress in the area will be supported by the development of
more sensitive tools for assessing trauma memories (Brewin,
2015; Ford, 2016).
In terms of formulation, clinicians are encouraged to use the
model flexibly and adapt to each individual. It is emphasized
that in practice it would not be recommended, unless there is
a clear preference from the person, to collaboratively discuss
all aspects of the formulation given its complexity. Instead, the
model is intended to guide clinicians in highlighting potential
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directions for collaborative micro-formulation and intervention.
People may not find it helpful to differentiate intrusion types and
in which case intrusions should be formulated generally, as in
existing cognitive-behavioral formulations of psychosis (Garety
et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001). The therapist, however, can hold in
mind hypotheses about the distinct mechanisms contributing to
different intrusions, and implications for intervention.
The model suggests trauma-focused therapy for psychosis
should target emotion regulation and autobiographical memory.
This proposal is consistent with protocols for cognitive-behavior
therapy for psychosis and PTSD, given their focus on modifying
coping, and understanding and contextualizing beliefs through
experiential learning (e.g., Fowler et al., 1995; Ehlers and Clark,
2008; Morrison, 2017). This model builds on these approaches
to emphasize the developmental context of coping mechanisms
and indicates memory interventions should be prioritized, at least
for some people. Further, as highlighted by the vignettes above, it
suggests that different interventions should be used depending
on the nature of people’s intrusions and the hypothesized
mechanisms driving them.
However, it may also be the case that the precise form
of memory modification is less relevant. Instead, the key
mechanism of change could be to develop alternative memory
representations, through whatever means, that have the retrieval
advantage over distressing representations (Brewin, 2006). For
example, there are indications that imagery rescripting may
be beneficial in PTSD, even though it does not involve fully
recontextualising the perceptual memory representation, and
instead focuses on encoding a new, less distressing representation
(Morina et al., 2017). Interestingly, two recent trials of trauma-
focused therapy for PTSD in psychosis found that exposure and
EMDR, but not cognitive restructuring, were effective in reducing
posttraumatic stress. This suggests the importance of accessing
and experientially modifying event memories, not just focusing
on appraisals in personal semantic memory (van den Berg et al.,
2015; Steel et al., 2017b).
Another intervention consideration is whether trauma
memories themselves need to be targeted or if it may be
beneficial to engender ways of relating to internal experiences or
memory retrieval that naturalistically support helpful processing.
For example, initial findings suggest mindfulness or memory
specificity training may reduce difficulties in people with
experience of childhood trauma and current depression, and in
PTSD, although to date this has not been robustly evaluated
in psychosis (Hitchcock et al., 2016; Kuyken et al., 2016). An
alternative approach would be to focus on emotion regulation.
Learning new ways to manage threat may have a beneficial
impact on memory representations, intrusions and appraisals.
For example, third wave approaches including dialectic behavior
therapy, mindfulness, acceptance and commitment therapy and
compassion-focused therapy could be of value (Linehan, 1993;
Mayhew and Gilbert, 2008; Morris et al., 2013). Further research
is required to identify the effectiveness of these approaches, and
what works best for whom.
Regardless of the specific cognitive-behavioral techniques
used, as with any psychological therapy, a safe, secure
and validating therapeutic relationship is essential, and the
importance of humane values is emphasized (Brabban et al.,
2016). Indeed, non-specific factors in the therapeutic relationship
may be particularly valuable in providing an alternative
experience to how people were treated in the past, and memories
of this may usefully moderate threat-focused representations.
Finally, whilst the model outlined here has focused on
psychological mechanisms, the social context in which difficulties
occur and the immense value of social and societal interventions
is acknowledged. The social consequences of victimization, in
terms of ongoing experiences of inequality and discrimination,
are well documented and can of course significantly impede
people’s potential to move on in their lives (Gilbert et al., 2010;
Metzler et al., 2016). Addressing these consequences (including
broader societal attitudes and responses to victimization) is
essential and could, indirectly, have a beneficial impact on the
posttraumatic stress processes outlined in the model.
FUTURE RESEARCH
To date, there has been relatively little investigation of the
posttraumatic stress processes implicated in the model and
clearly further work is needed to investigate the hypothesized
causal pathways. A strength of the model is its mechanism-
focused conceptualization, meaning it can cut across diagnostic
boundaries. Whilst the focus in this article has been on
psychosis, the model could potentially be used to formulate other
posttraumatic stress presentations where intrusions are viewed as
playing a causal role in maintaining distress. The model also has
a developmental emphasis, with a focus on childhood trauma.
However, it is recognized that trauma may occur later in life
and/or be related to experiences of psychosis. The mechanisms
described could be applicable to trauma occurring at any life
stage.
The methodological challenges of researching the area are
significant. It is ethically and legal complex and costly to conduct
methodologically robust, prospective studies, and many studies
use a cross-sectional design and relatively small samples. The
complexity of pathways to psychosis, and the heterogeneity
of psychosis itself, also clouds research endeavors. In addition
to assessment issues raised previously, concerns have been
highlighted regarding the reliability of trauma reports in
psychosis. However, comparable reliability has been found to
general population samples and obstacles to disclosure mean that
false negatives are more of an issue (Hardt and Rutter, 2004;
Fisher et al., 2011). A further concern is that subjective reports
of intrusions may not accurately assess involuntary retrieval.
Avoidance of trauma memory may distort people’s responses, and
people may not be aware of intrusions when they are triggered.
Whilst ethically contentious, it could be preferable to evoke
intrusions under experimental conditions or to develop new
techniques for in vivo investigation. Greater clarity and consensus
in operationalizing and assessing dimensions of voluntary
and involuntary memory retrieval, such as fragmentation and
coherence, will also support progress in the field.
A possible starting point for developing our understanding of
the pathways from trauma to psychosis could include detailed
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phenomenological assessment of involuntary and voluntary
recall of traumatic memories, and other intrusions. For example,
the model predicts more incoherent voluntary recall would be
related to increasingly fragmented, vivid and frequent intrusions,
which could manifest as hallucinatory experiences. Moving
beyond diagnostic boundaries to focus on the causal interplay
between specific posttraumatic processes and symptoms is also
a useful direction for future research. Experience Sampling
Methodology, whilst not without its limitations, may also be
a more promising route to investigating the ways in which
the implicated processes interact in real-world settings, and
potentially provide a means to deliver intervention prompts
(e.g., to support people in responding helpfully to intrusions)
(Reininghaus et al., 2015).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a multifactorial model of posttraumatic stress
in psychosis has been outlined, drawing on current theoretical
accounts and empirical evidence. Emotion regulation and
autobiographical memory (including perceptual, episodic and
personal semantic representations) are hypothesized to lead to
the development and maintenance of intrusions, appraisals and
coping responses in psychosis. Two types of intrusive experiences
are proposed to account for the diversity of phenomenological
links between trauma and intrusions. First, anomalous experience
intrusions, driven by emotion regulation and the generation
of novel images from autobiographical memory, may explain
experiences which appear unrelated to or which only thematically
mirror trauma history. Second, trauma memory intrusions may
be retrieved at any point along a continuum of contextualization,
with recollections ranging from coherent memories to very
fragmented intrusions. Given the extent of their fragmentation,
the latter are unlikely to be perceived as arising from memory
events even if they seem objectively linked. The reconstructive
nature of memory is emphasized, as stored representations
may be modified over time depending on the goals of the
working self. It is highlighted that at this stage the model
is speculative, and robust empirical designs are needed to
elucidate the mechanisms by which victimization impacts on
psychotic experiences. However, it is hoped that the model may
contribute to supporting people with psychosis and clinicians
in understanding the sometimes overwhelming and complex
difficulties that they face. In healthcare services, our role is to
get better at recognizing when people have experienced trauma,
assisting them in making sense of their problems and providing
the support they need to move on in their lives.
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